The Effects of Market Structure on Industry Growth: Rivalrous Non-excludable Capital by Christos Koulovatianos & Leonard J. Mirman
 




Leonard J. Mirman 
 
 
The Effects of Market Structure on Industry 
Growth: Rivalrous Non-excludable Capital 
 
January  2005 
 






DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
UNIVERSITY   OF   VIENNA 
 
All our working papers are available at: http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/papers.econ The Eﬀects of Market Structure on Industry
Growth: Rivalrous Nonexcludable Capital
Christos Koulovatianos* Leonard J. Mirman
University of Vienna University of Virginia
e-mail: koulovc6@univie.ac.at e-mail: lm8h@virginia.edu
First version: October 14, 2003
This version: January 5, 2005
* Corresponding author, Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse
9, A-1010, Vienna, Austria. E-mail: koulovc6@univie.ac.at, Tel: +43-1-427737426, Fax: +43-1-
42779374. This version of the paper builds on Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003a). We thank
Gerhard Sorger, an anonymous associate editor of this journal, and an anonymous referee for
their useful suggestions, and also participants at the SED 2004 meetings in Florence and seminar
participants at the University of Vienna and Sabancı University for their comments. Koulovatianos
thanks the Leventis foundation and the Austrian Science Fund under project P17886, for ﬁnancial
support.
1The Eﬀects of Market Structure on Industry
Growth: Rivalrous Non-excludable Capital
Abstract
We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where ﬁrms use rivalrous but
nonexcludable industry-speciﬁc capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation
depends on utilization, so ﬁrms inﬂuence the evolution of the capital equipment through
more or less intensive supply in the ﬁnal-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from,
(i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading
ﬁrms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic
Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the
eﬀect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth.
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21. Introduction
The role of capital deepening on economic growth is usually studied through highly aggre-
gated growth models. In these models, typically focusing on the macroeconomy, perfect
competition is the prevailing market structure. Yet, little attention has been paid to the
forces and incentives behind capital deepening and growth in smaller markets, like industries.
In a signiﬁcant number of industries, ﬁrms sell their ﬁnal products in imperfectly com-
petitive markets. Classic Cournot-type oligopolistic incentives arise in such industries. Yet,
whenever speciﬁc capital is useful for production, in addition to its supply strategy, each
ﬁrm’s intertemporal capital allocation is a strategic lever. By accumulating capital, a ﬁrm
c a nr e t a i nah i g hp r o d u c t i v ec a p acity, and boost its oligopolistic competitiveness and proﬁt
margin over time.
We focus on industries with production that relies on the use of speciﬁc types of capital,
infrastructure or speciﬁc equipment, which is provided exogenously. Capital in our analysis
is nonexcludable, it can be used at no cost by all ﬁrms, and also rivalrous, subject to a ﬁrst-
come ﬁrst-served rule or to congestion costs. Examples of publicly provided infrastructure
are airports, harbors, roads, pipe-lines, transmission grids, railroads, or telecommunications
lines. Governments determine and control the full provision and the growth rate of the avail-
able public infrastructure. Typically, governments follow rules for ﬁnancing its maintenance
or growth.1
Another key feature of capital in our study is that it depreciates with utilization. Yet,
the evolution of speciﬁc capital, and, consequently the long-run growth of industries that
use it, depend on the production, i.e., aggregate supply decisions of ﬁrms; more intensive use
increases the cost of its maintenance or speeds up depreciation. Often, governments impose
1 For example, a government may use a constant fraction of the ﬁscal budget every year in order to ﬁnance
a certain type of infrastructure.
1special taxes on ﬁrms for the use of roads or ports, in order to slow down the depreciation
of these structures.
Another important example of speciﬁc capital is human resources in basic research. Ba-
sic research activities, usually taking place in universities, target inventions. Research for
marketable innovations, on the other hand, is usually ﬁnanced by ﬁrms. Industries may take
human resources out of universities, out of basic research activities, in order to direct them
to market-oriented innovations. For example, the high attrition rates in computer-science
graduate programs or engineering, can be explained by the eﬀort of companies to tempt stu-
dents to work on innovations concerning their IT products, by oﬀering higher salaries. The
time of researchers is rival and also wasted from producing inventions, a critical determinant
for the growth rate of revolutionary new knowledge.
The classic Cournot quantity competition among ﬁrms stems from the fact that the
presence of a ﬁrm in the market constitutes a market externality for its market competitors.
Unlike perfectly competitive environments with price-taking behavior, the supply strategies
of competitors directly enter the revenue function of a ﬁrm, a fundamental part of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximization objective.2
Yet, the nonexcludability and rivalry of capital allows more than one ﬁrms to utilize
capital from the same source, with all ﬁrms contributing to the depreciation of the stock.
From the viewpoint of each ﬁrm, competitors diminish future production possibilities. This
creates a commons problem, an additional competitive element to this of Cournot supply
competition. The presence of a ﬁrm in the common pool for capital utilization, constitutes
a dynamic externality for its competitors for capital utilization.
Our framework also ﬁts, directly, industries with production based on natural resources.
2 Several recent papers still deal with the issue of existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
static frameworks. See, for example, Gaudet and Salant (1991), Novshek (1984a), (1984b) and (1985).
2The typical commons problems that have been studied in the literature are not limited,
however, to these applications.3 They are transparent in other industries, as in the above
examples, that utilize capital from outside providers and the capital is rivalrous and non-
excludable.
In order to examine the link between the market structure and industry growth, the key,
and our focus, is to uncover the impact of each externality, the market externality and the
dynamic externality, on the supply strategies of ﬁrms. The type of non-cooperative dynamic
games that we study, involve inﬁnite-horizon strategic optimal control.4 To our knowledge,
so far, only the impact of the dynamic externality has been studied in the literature. So,
introducing the market externality is a crucial contribution of this paper.
The nature of the two externalities brings signiﬁcant technical complexities into the
optimal control problem faced by each ﬁrm in such non-cooperative games. The presence
of these externalities in the dynamic game makes the strategies of competitors part of the
structural maximization problem of a ﬁrm. In order that the problem of each ﬁrm be well-
deﬁned, the primitives of the model should imply that the equilibrium strategies possess
convenient functional properties. So, we model the economic environment so as to obtain
linear equilibrium strategies that make the analysis tractable. In order to accomplish this,
we use homogeneous or isoelastic functions to capture consumer demand and the primitives
of ﬁrms. Such parametric functions are the most commonly used in both theoretical and
applied analysis of dynamic problems.
To meet our goal, which is to study the economic impact of the two externalities on
3 See, for example, Mirman (1979), Levhari and Mirman (1980), who were the ﬁrst to analyze the commons
problem using noncooperative dynamic games, and the following work by Amir (1989), Sundaram (1989),
Benhabib and Radner (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1992) and (1993), and Sorger (2004) who apply their
analysis to natural-resource games, focusing mostly on the commons problem.
4 Other terms for the class of dynamic games we examine is “Markovian games,” or, as in Cohen and Michel
(1988), “memoryless feedback Nash games.”
3industry growth, our parametric model is composed of a set of primitives that encompasses
alternative market structures, which are compared analytically. First, we characterize the
strategy of a dynamic monopolist. This is the benchmark case, where the output market is
supplied by a monopolist who is also alone in inﬂuencing the evolution of the capital stock.
Second, we consider the case of two monopolists utilizing capital from the same provider. In
other words, there are two markets, each supplied by a monopolist. We compare the results
in this market structure to the results of the pure monopolist case and ﬁnd that the presence
of the dynamic externality leads the two monopolistic ﬁrms to supply more in each period,
c o m p a r e dt ot h ep u r em o n o p o l i s t .B u tm o r ep r o d u c t i o ni ne a c hp e r i o dm e a n sm o r ec a p i t a l
utilization, hence more capital depreciation. Therefore, the dynamic externality reduces
capital growth, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ result, as in Levhari and Mirman (1980).
Third, when the two ﬁrms (both inﬂuencing the capital stock) also compete in the same
market, both the dynamic and the market externality are present. Compared to the bench-
mark monopoly, we ﬁnd that the aggregate supply of ﬁrms in each period is always higher.
But compared to the market structure of two monopolists with common capital utilization,
the impact depends on the model’s primitives. We ﬁnd that below a threshold level for the
demand elasticity (depending only on the number of ﬁrms in the market), the aggregate
supply of ﬁrms increases even more as compared to the structure of two monopolists. When
the demand elasticity is higher than that threshold level, the aggregate supply of two mo-
nopolists can be higher than the aggregate supply of the duopolists, depending on the values
of the other primitives. These primitives are: a relatively low convexity of the cost function,
relatively low growth opportunities for capital, relatively high interest rates, and a relatively
weak endogenous depreciation technology.
Last, to relax the assumption of non-excludable capital. We study two ﬁrms selling in
4the same market, but utilizing capital from separate exogenous providers. We show that
this problem is very complex, as it involves two capital stocks and strategic considerations
about the evolution of both stocks by both ﬁrms. Yet, we characterize, analytically, the
symmetric strategies of ﬁrms within our parametric framework, which turn out to be linear
with respect to the two capital stocks.
The presence of the two externalities, the dynamic and the market externality, in dynamic
oligopolistic markets was ﬁrst studied by Mirman (1979). Although Mirman (1979) does not
present an analysis of the impact of the two externalities on strategies, the two elements are
pointed out in necessary equilibrium conditions. Moreover, Mirman (1979) explores prob-
lems that can arise in dynamic oligopoly models under usual assumptions on the objective
of each ﬁrm and on the dynamic constraints, assumptions that would lead to tractable de-
cision rules in a standard optimal control problem. In particular, in the dynamic oligopoly
case supply strategies may not, in general, be continuous functions. However, continuous
diﬀerentiability of supply strategies of all ﬁrms is an important property for determining
equilibrium strategies.
Mirman (1979) shows how linear demand functions lead to either a corner solution or
an interior solution that is exactly the same as the static solution. It is clear from this
analysis of Mirman (1979) that the linear demand model is not appropriate for addressing
the issues raised in this paper. Thus, our parametric framework does not involve linear
demand functions, but isoelastic ones. Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003b) study the link
between market structure and industry growth when ﬁrms pursue cost-reducing knowledge
accumulation through R&D investment using an alternative model speciﬁcation, but they
p o i n to u tt h es a m es t r a t e g i ce l e m e n t sb e h i n dﬁrm behavior, namely the importance of the
d y n a m i ca n dt h em a r k e te x t e r n a l i t y .
5There is little theoretical work in the literature dealing with the dynamic problem of
ﬁrms interacting both in the market and for the utilization of capital. On the other hand,
Ericson and Pakes (1995) show the importance of Markov-perfect dynamics in an imperfectly
competitive environment for empirical work. Vedenov and Miranda (2001) and Pakes and
McGuire (2001) discuss numerical procedures for oligopoly games with accumulation of some
state variable. Both studies suggest ways of overcoming the several technical diﬃculties.
In section 2, we present the general formulation of three alternative market structures
with nonexcludable rivalrous capital, pointing out some technical complexities for securing
equilibrium existence and also for characterizing strategies. In section 3, we outline our para-
metric model and, through comparing equilibrium supply strategies among three alternative
market structures, we reveal the role of the dynamic externality and the market externality
in explaining the dependence of industry growth on the market structure. In section 4 we
examine a setup where ﬁrms utilize capital from their own, exclusive provider, showing that
the supply strategies in our parametric framework are linear.
2. Economic environment and alternative market structures
Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon, t =0 ,1,.... The inverse-demand function,
pt = D(qt) ,
characterizes consumer demand for the ﬁnal good, q, in each period. Speciﬁc capital, denoted
as k, is necessary for production. In particular, the production of q units of the ﬁnal good
requires that ψ(q) units of capital are consumed by utilization, with ψ
  (q) > 0.I n t h e
case where capital is some form of infrastructure, capital depreciates endogenously. Capital
utilization wears equipment out, or it leaves less time for its maintenance.5 In the case
5 This idea of capital utilization is also studied by Greenwood et. al. (1988) in a general-equilibrium
framework.
6where capital is a natural resource (renewable or not) and units of this natural resource are
necessary as raw material for producing the ﬁnal good, it is straightforward that producing
a certain level of output requires the consumption of part of this stock.
Capital obeys an exogenous rule of renewal, depending on previous period’s stock, namely,
kt+1 = f (kt) ,
with f  (k) > 0.W h e nN ﬁrms exploit the same capital stock in order for each of them to
produce a quantity, qi,t in period t,w i t hi ∈{ 1,...,N},t h el a wo fm o t i o no fc a p i t a li s ,
kt+1 = f (kt)−
N  
i=1
ψ(qi,t) .( 1 )
In our model, ﬁrms do not have the explicit option to add to the capital stock.6 In order
to produce output, a ﬁrm also needs to hire labor. The cost of hired labor, l,i ne a c hp e r i o d
is given by,
ct = c(lt) ,( 2 )
where c  > 0. The capital stock can have a positive eﬀect on production capacity. More
capital stock can augment the productivity of labor, giving the possibility to reduce produc-
tion costs per output unit. In the case of infrastructure, more infrastructure may mean less
congestion during productive activities. When capital is a natural resource, abundance of
the resource may reduce search costs or costs of extraction of a unit of the resource. The
production technology is given by,
qt = F (kt,l t) ,( 3 )
6 We present this extension in Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003b), where, as we mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the stock of capital is knowledge and ﬁrms make explicit investments out of their proﬁts in order to
achieve cost reducing innovations.
7with F2 > 0 and F1,F 12 ≥ 0.7 Applying the implicit function theorem, the production
function given by (3) implies that, for a particular level of available capital, k, in order to
produce a certain quantity of ﬁnal good, q, at least
lt = L(kt,q t) (4)
units of labor need to be hired (where L1 ≤ 0,a n dL2 > 0). Substituting the least necessary
labor for producing q g i v e nb y( 4 ) ,i n t o( 2 ) ,t h ec o s tf o rp r o d u c i n gac e r t a i nl e v e lo ft h eﬁ n a l
good, given a speciﬁc level of capital is,
ct = c(L(kt,q t)) ≡ C (kt,q t) ,( 5 )
with C2 > 0 and C1 ≤ 0.
2.1 The Dynamic Monopoly
The objective of the dynamic monopoly, our benchmark market structure, is to determine
a supply-quantity decision rule as a function of the available capital, q = Q(k),s ot h a ti t




t [D(qt)qt − C (kt,q t)] ,( 6 )
given k0 > 0 and with δ ≡ 1
1+r, the proﬁt discount factor, determined by an exogenous
constant interest rate r>0.
The problem of the monopolist can be written in a Bellman-equation form,
VM (k)= m a x
q≥0
{D(q)q − C (k,q)+δVM (f (k) − ψ(q))} .( 7 )
7 Throughout the paper, whenever functions are multivariate, i.e. with n>1 variables, we use numbered
subscripts in order to denote the partial derivative with respect to the i-th argument of a function, where
i ∈{ 1,...,n}.






the marginal lifetime proﬁts implied by the stock of capital that the ﬁrm leaves available for
next period, yields the Euler equation,
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where   q is the output strategy of the ﬁrm in the subsequent period. A static monopoly would
set the right-hand side of equation (8) to zero. On the other hand, the dynamic monopoly
takes into account the inﬂuence that its current supply has on the evolution of capital in
the future. Supplying more in the current period reduces the capital stock in the future, so,
the ﬁrm’s cost per unit of output increases. The Euler equation (8) serves as the benchmark
equation for understanding the strategic elements that appear in other market structures,
when the dynamic and the market externality are introduced.
2.2 Two monopolists utilizing capital from the same provider
In this subsection we look at two identical ﬁrms A and B, each selling in its own market as
a monopolist, facing the same inverse demand function, having the same cost function, and
utilizing capital from the same provider. So, capital evolves according to,
kt+1 = f (kt) − ψ(qA,t) − ψ(qB,t) .( 9 )
Compared to the monopoly problem of the previous subsection, the two monopolistic ﬁrms
have a direct capital-accumulation interaction. We say that the presence of both ﬁrms using
t h es a m es o u r c eo fc a p i t a lg i v e sr i s et oadynamic externality.8
8 The term ‘dynamic externality’ was ﬁrst introduced by Mirman (1979). Levhari and Mirman (1980)
provide another model that oﬀers an explicit analysis of the dynamic externality. It is important to stress
that the corresponding form of our equation (9) in the Levhari and Mirman (1980) setup is,
kt+1 = f (kt − ψ(kA,t) − ψ(kB,t)) ,
9We denote the value function of the two monopolistic ﬁrms with a direct capital-accumulation
interaction as VA,m and VB,m.9 Due to the symmetry of the setup we can focus on the prob-
lem of ﬁrm A without loss of generality. The problem of ﬁrm A in a Bellman-equation form
is given by,
VA,m (k)= m a x
qA≥0
{D(qA)qA − C (k,qA)qA+
+δVA,m (f (k) − ψ(qA) − ψ(QB,m(k)))} ,( 1 0 )
where QB,m(k) is the supply strategy as a function of the capital stock of ﬁrm B. The
problem of ﬁrm B is given by the same Bellman equation as in (10), with the roles of A and
B switched.
At this point, we emphasize that the Bellman equation given by (10) has a particularly
complex element: the presence of the other ﬁrm’s strategy, QB,m(k), in the objective of ﬁrm
A. With QB,m(k) in the objective function of the ﬁrm it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd conditions that
imply the concavity of VA,m, the existence of equilibrium or useful properties of strategies,
such as continuity and monotonicity.10
Levhari and Mirman (1980) use speciﬁc parametric forms in order to tackle the technical
complexities arising from the diﬃculty in characterizing QB,m(k), and, in particular, their
functional forms imply that QB,m(k) is a linear function in k.11 In our parametric framework,
VA,m is concave throughout the whole domain of k, so we proceed under the convention that
which means that capital exloitation takes place at the beginning of each period. On the contrary, in our
setup, capital exploitation takes place at the end of each period. This diﬀerent timing of actions helps us to
present our analysis more easily, but there is no inﬂuence on the qualitative results.
9 We denote the setup of two monopolists exploiting capital from the same source using the subscript ‘m’
distinguishing it from the benchmark monopoly model of the previous subsection, which goes with the
subscript ‘M.’
10Mirman (1979) presents examples of ‘classic’ or seemingly ‘innocent’ (at least in the single monopolist case)
functional forms used to capture the fundamentals of this two-monopolist setup, where the value function
VA,m is not concave, or not continuous, and the strategy QA,m is not continuous or monotonic.
11It is easy to show that with our timing of exploitation (exploitation occurs at the end of each period), the
strategy QB,m(k) is linear in f (k), which is another way of tackling the technical problems of this setup.
10every desirable property is present.






, the marginal lifetime proﬁts implied by the stock of capital that the ﬁrm leaves
strategically available for next period, after taking into account the response of its competi-
tor, we arrive at the necessary condition,
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where   qA is the output strategy of ﬁrm A in the next period. In Levhari, Michener and
Mirman (1981) a simple method is used to show that, under quite general conditions on
f, the tendency of this setup is to lead to overexploitation compared to the benchmark
monopoly model (which can also be considered as a cooperative solution).
2.3 Duopoly with ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same provider
When ﬁrms interact both in the market and also compete for the exploitation of capital from
the same provider, the competitive motives become very rich. Indeed, not only are both the
static market (Cournot) externality and the dynamic externality present, but, due to the
dynamic nature of the competitive environment, they interact. The dynamic externality
implies an increase in present output, before the competitor exploits the capital stock in the
future. Yet, due to the dependence of the cost function on capital, and with cost being a
key part of the proﬁt margin of ﬁrms, by inﬂuencing next period’s capital stock, the ﬁrm
inﬂuences the optimal supply strategy in the next period, i.e., it can inﬂuence the market
(Cournot) externality in the future.
11These interactions appear more clearly in the necessary optimality conditions of the ﬁrms.
We denote the value function of the duopolistic ﬁrms with a direct capital-accumulation
interaction as VA,d and VB,d. Due to the symmetry of the ﬁrms, again, we can focus on the
problem of ﬁrm A without loss of generality. The problem of ﬁrm A in a Bellman-equation
form is given by,
VA,d (k)= m a x
qA≥0
{D(qA + QB (k))qA − C (k,qA)+δVA,d (f (k) − ψ(qA) − ψ(QB (k)))} ,
(12)
where QB (k) is the supply strategy of ﬁrm B. The problem of ﬁrm B is given by the Bellman
equation as in (12), except that A and B are switched.
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, appearing at the end of the right hand side of equation (13). However,
both the market externality and the dynamic externality appear in various other places of
(13). For example, the term D
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the marginal proﬁt of ﬁrm A in the next period, contains the strategy QB (k) wherever
next period’s capital,   k, appears, through the dynamic condition (9). Moreover, the market




, on next period’s marginal proﬁt of ﬁrm A.





of (13) reveals, ﬁrm A takes into





on next period’s marginal revenue of A, due to a change in the level of future capital.
3. A parametric model encompassing all three market structures
Central in our model is the tradeoﬀ that industrial ﬁrms face between exploiting capital
today and saving capital for the future, given that part of the speciﬁc capital is consumed
during the production process. This tradeoﬀ, however, depends on the alternative imperfect-
competition environments. As has been shown, several strategic incentives arise due to
the interaction of the ﬁrms with each other in the market for the ﬁnal good as well as in
the process that determines future capital deepening. These incentives are fundamental to
understanding the link between market structure and industry dynamics.
We have shown that there are two externalities present when two ﬁrms supply in the
same market and utilize capital from the same provider, a dynamic externality and a market
externality. However, we have not been able to characterize the economic impact of these
externalities on growth, since the model we have described so far is too general to study in
this setting. In this section, we develop a common parametric framework that encompasses
all three market structures that were analyzed in the previous section.
Crucial about the presence of these externalities in the models that we analyze is that
strategies of competitors become part of the structural maximization problem of a ﬁrm.
Thus, in order that the problem of each ﬁrm be well-deﬁned, and, above all, that equilibrium
strategies exist, we present a model in which the primitives imply linearity of the equilibrium
strategies. In particular, our focus is on using homogeneous or isoelastic functions to capture
13the primitives of ﬁrms, capital growth possibilities, and consumer demand. We apply some
parametric restrictions that yield linear decision rules of the form Q(k)=ωf (k).
Let the inverse demand function in the market for the ﬁnal product, q,b e ,
D(q)=q
− 1









with φ ≥ 0 ,( 1 5 )
i.e. the intertemporal production function of capital is a CES function. Endogenous depre-
ciation is captured by the function,
ψ(q)=θq ,w i t h θ ∈ (0,1] .
In other words, the depreciation of capital is proportional to the supply of the ﬁnal good in
each period. The ﬁnal-good production function is,





















The labor-cost function is,
c(l)=νl
ξ ,w i t h ν ∈ (0,1) and ξ>0 .
Therefore, given that each ﬁrm has free utilization rights over capital, the cost function of a
ﬁrm is given by,










υ .( 1 7 )
143.1 Parameter restrictions and scope of analysis










Using these two deﬁnitions, from (17) and (16) the cost function becomes,
C (k,q)=ν [f (k)]
−β q
ρ .( 1 8 )
In order to obtain strategies of the form Q(k)=ωf (k), for all ﬁrms and for all market
structures we set,
ρ − β =1−
1
η





.( 2 0 )
The ﬁrst parameter restriction, given by (19), implies linear strategies, while the second
constraint, (20), yields a unique equilibrium in all market structures.
The parameters, α, φ, η, θ, υ, ξ, φ, give enough degrees of freedom for studying the
empirical link between the market structure and the growth rate in industries. As we show
below, none of the strategies is inﬂuenced by the value of parameter φ. Yet, diﬀerent values
for parameter φ imply diﬀerent dynamics, and the selection of φ is important for addressing
diﬀerent economic questions.
Speciﬁcally,





. In this case, the intertemporal production func-
tion of capital is f (k)=α
η
η−1k = Zk, a growth-theory ingredient that can lead





.12 With α>1,t h i ss e t u p
is appropriate for addressing the question of the link market structure and in-
dustry growth in industries depending on growing publicly provided forms of
infrastructure, like airports, harbors, roads, pipe-lines, transmission grids, rail-
roads, telecommunications lines, and also for addressing the trade-oﬀ between
how markets allocate human resources into basic research for inventions versus
research for innovations. In case α =1 , the model is appropriate for the study
of markets trading a non-renewable resource.
(ii) Set φ>0 and α ∈ (0,1). In this case, the production function of capital
i saf u n c t i o no fc u r r e n tc a p i t a la n dac o n s t a n tφ. The elasticity of substitution
between current capital and the constant factor is the same as the elasticity
of demand. There are two reasons for this assumption. First, it provides linear
analytic solutions. The analytical simplicity of this framework allows us to derive
the comparative statics (or dynamics) of the model. Second, with φ>0,t h e
model has a zero-growth-rate steady state.13 This setup is also appropriate for
studying markets for goods depending on renewable natural resources.
3.2 Equilibrium in the three market structures
For the cases of, (i) the benchmark monopolist (carrying the subscript “M”), (ii) two monop-
olists utilizing capital from t h es a m ep r o v i d e r( s u b s c r i p t“ m”), and (iii) duopolists utilizing
capital from the same provider (subscript “d”), the common element is that the state space
of all these three games is one-dimensional, namely there is one state variable, k. Moreover,
12We place the upper bound 1
δ on parameter α in order to guarantee the boundedness of the value function
of each ﬁrm.
13Moreover, for empirical applications of our model, the function given by (15) has three parameters, α, η
and φ, giving enough degrees of freedom for treating data through data-mining approaches.
16the equilibrium strategies for these three games are of the form Q(k)=ωf (k). For these
reasons, we can accommodate the calculation of the strategies in all three market structures
in a single presentation.
Let Nµ be the number of ﬁrms in the same market, with Nµ ∈{ 1,2},a n da l s ol e tNκ be










t =0 ,1,....( 2 1 )




























given k0 > 0, and with parameters β and ρ obeying the restrictions g i v e nb y( 1 9 )a n d( 2 0 ) .
We solve problem (P1) in two steps. First, we use the symmetric strategies,
qi,t = ωyt ,( 2 3 )
with ω treated as an undetermined coeﬃcient and we calculate the value function given the
functional form, (23). Then, we form the Bellman equation, derive the optimality conditions
of ﬁrm j, show that, indeed, the equilibrium strategies fall in the class of the functional form
given by (23). We further show that ω is such that the maximization problems of all players
are well-deﬁned, and that this solution is unique. With these results at hand, we take the
second step, to characterize and compare the strategies of diﬀerent market structures.
14So, for the benchmark monopoly it is Nµ = Nκ =1 , for the two monopolists with a common capital provider
it is Nµ =1and Nκ =2 , whereas for the duopolists with a common capital provider it is Nµ = Nκ =2 .
173.2.1 Calculation of the value function
Using the strategies given by (23) with ω as an undetermined coeﬃcient, applying (19), and
















.( 2 4 )
Substituting (23) in the constraint of (P1), yields,










t + φ(1 − θNκω)
1− 1
η .( 2 5 )
































Substituting this last equation into (24) and the result back into the objective of problem

















0 + b ,( 2 6 )
where b is a constant.
3.2.2 The strategies
The Bellman equation of ﬁrm j ∈{ 1,...,Nµ}∩{1,...,Nκ} is given by,













































































































































Thus, applying condition (19), the nature of strategies given by (23) is cross-validated. The
symmetry of ﬁrms implies that all strategies are the same, so substituting (23) into (27) and





















η − αδ(1 − θNκω)
.( 2 8 )
3.2.3 Admissibility and uniqueness of strategies
The strategies of ﬁrms are admissible if the maximization problem of each ﬁrm is well-deﬁned.
In our setup, the key to admissibility is that θNκω ∈ [0,1). To show this, we set,
χ ≡ θNκω .

























η − αδ(1 − χ)
≡ h(χ) ,( 2 9 )
19after having used (19) as well.
In (29), we have named the left-hand side g(χ), and the right-hand side h(χ).T h e
properties of g(χ) for χ ∈ [0,1] are,
g(0) = 1 −
1
ηNµ
,a n d g
  (χ) < 0 ,( 3 0 )
where g  (χ) < 0 rests upon our parameter restriction (20).15 The properties of h(χ) when
χ ∈ [0,1] are,
h(0) = 0 , h(1) = ∞,a n dh
  (χ) > 0 ,( 3 1 )
where h  (χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ [0,1] if αδ
Nκ < 1, whereas if αδ































a condition that guarantees that the marginal proﬁts are positive, and, thus, proﬁts in each period are also
















I nt h ec a s ew h e r eν ≤ (θNκ)
β Nµ
− 1
η, a condition guaranteeing that proﬁts in each period are non-negative
for all χ ∈ [0,1], g(χ) is continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,1].F o r ν>(θNκ)
β Nµ
− 1



















. For all parametric setups, the interesting fea-
ture of g(χ) is that it is continuously diﬀerentiable with g  (χ) < 0 on the region of [0,1] where marginal
proﬁts (and thus, each period’s proﬁts) are positive.
20for all χ ∈ (0,1].16
Figure 1 summarizes graphically the properties given by (30) and (31), and depicts why
the equilibrium strategies, denoted by ω∗, in all three market structures, are both admissible
(speciﬁcally, θNκω∗ ∈ (0,1)), and unique for the region of non-negative marginal proﬁts,
and thus, for the region where each period’s proﬁts are strictly positive. Note that for some
values of the parameters, explained in footnote 15, the set of values of χ for which marginal
proﬁts are negative can be empty.
3.3 The impact of the dynamic externality
In order to assess the impact of the dynamic externality on ﬁrm strategies, and, in particular,
whether the ‘tragedy of the commons’ dominates, we compare the benchmark monopoly case,
denoted as “M,” with the case of two monopolies utilizing capital from the same provider,
denoted as “m.” This comparison is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The aggregate exploitation rate of ﬁrms in market structure “m”i s





Using the fact that Nµ =1in both cases, we can express the right-hand side of (29) as
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χ ≥ (1 − χ)
1− 1
η for all χ ∈ [0,1] with equality if and only if χ =0 ,t h ef a c tt h a t
αδ
























β χ−β − ν
 2 ,
our parameter restriction (20) implies that G2 (χ,Nκ) > 0. Therefore, the equilibrium
strategies in the two cases are captured by Figure 2, which proves the proposition.
The conclusion from Proposition 1 is that, as in Levhari and Mirman (1980), the dynamic
externality leads to the dominance of the ‘tragedy of the commons,’ irrespective of the
parameters aﬀecting the demand function, the cost function, growth possibilities given by
f (k), and the endogenous capital depreciation technology.
3.4 The impact of the market externality in addition to the dy-
namic externality
The starting point for studying the impact of the market externality in addition to the
dynamic externality, is the comparison of the market structure of the benchmark monopoly,
denoted as “M,” with the market structure of a duopoly with both ﬁrms, again, utilizing
capital from the same provider, denoted as “d.”
3.4.1 Comparison of the benchmark monopoly with a duopoly
utilizing capital from the same provider
We express condition (29) somewhat diﬀerently, re-arranging the position of parameter ρ











η − αδ(1 − χ)
(33)





ρ χ−β − ν
θ
βχ−β − ν





ρ χ−β − ν
2ρ−1θ
βχ−β − ν
,( 3 5 )
where the parameter constraint (19) has been used. Since the right-hand side of (29), given
by (33) is common across the two market structures “M”a n d“ d,” the key is to compare
Γd (χ) with ΓM (χ).
To simplify notation,
χ

























Thus, (34) and (35) imply,






.( 3 6 )
We pay attention to strategies that lead to positive proﬁts in both setups. From condition
(27) it is implied that the value function is positive if the marginal proﬁt in each period is









.( 3 7 )
Note that, recalling Figure 1, equation (29) implies that, in equilibrium, proﬁts are always
positive, namely condition (37) holds in equilibrium.
23Proposition 2 The aggregate exploitation rate of ﬁrms in market structure “d”i s





W ep r o v et h a t( 3 6 )a l w a y sh o l d s .F o ra l lz complying with (37), both ΓM (χ) and Γd (χ)














bM + c − aM − d
cbM − daM
.( 3 9 )
It is straightforward to see that under, (20),
bM >a M .( 4 0 )
Moreover, for any values of ρ complying with (20),
c>a M ,( 4 1 )







aM.17 I ne q u i l i b r i u mi tm u s tb et h a tz> ν





bM + c − aM − d
cbM − daM
⇔ (c − aM)(bM − aM) > 0 ,
which always holds, due to (40) and (41), completes the proof.
The result of Proposition 2 is depicted graphically by Figure 3. So, we have proved
that, for all parameters of the model, the dynamic externality and the market externality,
together, lead to overexploitation of capital compared to the benchmark monopoly case.
17Condition (41) holds even for the lower bound of ρ, namely for 1 − 1







> 0, for all
η>1.
243.4.2 Comparison between strategies of two monopolists utilizing
capital from the same provider with the duopoly
For completing the comparison among all market structures, in this section we compare the
market structure of two monopolists utilizing capital from the same provider, denoted as
“m,” with the market structure of a duopoly with both ﬁrms, again, utilizing capital from
t h es a m ep r o v i d e r ,d e n o t e da s“ d.”
We use condition (29), rearranging terms, and noting that Nκ =2in both cases. This











η − αδ(1 − χ)
,( 4 2 )
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(2θ)
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β χ−β − ν
.( 4 4 )
The two deﬁnitions, (43) and (44) imply that,




















whereas the constants c and d are deﬁned above. Again, we pay attention to strategies that









.( 4 6 )
25The role of the demand elasticity In a static framework, the lower the demand elas-
ticity, η, the lower the supply of a monopolist. In our dynamic framework, this means that
monopolists would consume the capital stock at a lower rate and reach a higher steady state.
In the following proposition we point out a cutoﬀ level for the demand elasticity, below which














⇔ η ≤ 2.73 ,
the aggregate exploitation rate of ﬁrms in market structure “d” is always higher than the




Under (46), rearranging the terms of (45),






.( 4 7 )
Using (19), d =2
− 1
η (2θ)




for all z satisfying (46). Using (19) again,

















proving that (45) holds in this case. The equilibrium exploitation rate of ﬁrms, under the
restriction that η ≤ 2.73, is captured by Figure 4.
26The cutoﬀ level for demand elasticity is diﬀerent, depending on Nµ. Indeed, in our
model, the only factor inﬂuencing the threshold level of demand elasticity for which the
market structure “d” to more capital utilization, is the number of ﬁrms in the market, Nµ.
Steady States for a low demand elasticity (η ≤ 2.73) When η ≤ 2.73 and φ>0,t h e
steady state growth of capital is zero. With propositions 1 and 3, the steady-state levels of








Also for the case that φ =0 , growth in the case of a duopoly with both ﬁrms utilizing capital
from the same provider is lower than in the case of two monopolistic ﬁrms utilizing capital
from the same provider.
Higher demand elasticity (η>2.73) For the case where η>2.73 ⇔ c<a m,u n d e r
restriction (46), we can solve inequality (45) for z, to see that
Λm(χ) < Λd (χ) ⇔ z>ν
bm + c − am − d
cbm − dam













Substituting ¯ z =( ¯ χ)
−β from (48) into (43) and (44),





















.( 4 9 )
The results expressed by (48) and (49), reveal a notable property of ¯ χ, the point where
the functions Λm (χ) and Λd (χ) meet (while for all χ<¯ χ, Λm (χ) < Λd (χ)): ¯ χ depends
on η, ρ, θ and ν. On the other hand, the level Λm(¯ χ)=Λ d (¯ χ) depends only on η and
ρ. These observations prove very useful for motivating and understanding the comparisons
that follow. When η ≤ 2.73, the meeting point of Λm(χ) and Λd (χ) implies negative values
27for these functions. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy rates χ∗
d, χ∗
m are less than ¯ χ,s i n c e
for any χ>¯ χ it is impossible for Λm(χ) or Λd (χ) to meet with Ξ(χ),s i n c eΞ(χ) is positive
for all χ ∈ (0,1]. This insight is depicted in Figure 4.
In the case η>2.73,t h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fam o n o p o l yh a v i n gh i g h e rs u p p l yi so p e n ,a n d
diﬃcult to characterize analytically. Thus, we present a numerical example, in Figure 6.
The parameter values we use are η =5(> 2.73), δ = .96 (reﬂecting an interest rate of about
4%), α = .3, ρ =1 , θ = .6, ν = .9,w h i l eβ is derived using condition (19), i.e. it is equal
to .2 in this example. Figure 6 shows that for these parameter values, χ∗
d <χ ∗
m,a n d ,g i v e n




Since a complete analytical account of the factors leading to strategies where χ∗
d <χ ∗
m
is cumbersome, in what follows, we restrict our numerical example to the parameter values
used above, but relax each parameter, one by one,s h o w i n gt h ei m p a c to fe a c he c o n o m i c
primitive on strategies.
The impact of a ‘more convex’ cost function (higher ρ) A key determinant of
natural monopolies is that their production function exhibits increasing returns to scale, or,
alternatively, a ‘slightly convex’ or even a concave cost function. In our numerical example,
we retain all parameter values at the same level, but we increase the value of parameter ρ,
by setting ρ =7 . As can be seen in Figure 7.a, this discourages the two monopolists from
supplying more, and the implied strategies have the property χ∗
d >χ ∗
m,o n c ea g a i n .
The impact of higher growth possibilities of the capital stock (higher α)o ro fa
lower interest rate (higher δ) The insights gained from (49) and (48), that the levels
of Λm(¯ χ)=Λ d (¯ χ) do not depend on any parameters other than ρ and η,a n dt h a tt h e
cutoﬀ point ¯ χ depends only on ρ, η, θ and ν, lead us to observe that whenever other factors,
28inﬂuencing the function Ξ(χ), change, then the result of Figure 6, that χ∗
d <χ ∗
m,c a nb e
reversed. For example, whenever, α increases, the growth possibilities of the capital stock
increase. This pushes the function Ξ(χ) upwards, and can lead both equilibrium strategies,
χ∗
d and χ∗
m, to levels below the cutoﬀ ¯ χ, while the level Λm(¯ χ)=Λ d (¯ χ) remains the same,
which implies that χ∗
d >χ ∗
m. Such a case is shown in Figure 7.b, where α = .7, with all other
parameter values set at the levels of the example of Figure 6. Note that a higher δ,n a m e l y
a lower interest rate (the opportunity cost of a ﬁrm), leads to the same result as increasing
α: to lower the levels of χ∗
d and χ∗
m, with a potential to drive them below the cutoﬀ level ¯ χ.
The impact of lower cost (lower ν) or of a faster depreciation technology (higher
θ) As is implied by (48), a lower cost parameter ν, or a faster depreciation technology, a
higher θ, both drive the cutoﬀ point ¯ χ upwards, while Λm(¯ χ)=Λ d (¯ χ) stay at the same
level. At the same time, due to (49), Ξ(χ) remains unaﬀected. In Figure 7.c we have set
ν = .8, with all other parameter values set at the levels of the example of Figure 6. In
Figure 7.d, we have set θ =1 , with all other parameter values, again, set at the numerical
benchmark of Figure 6. In both Figures, 7.c and 7.d, the result is that χ∗
d >χ ∗
m, unlike the
implication of Figure 6.
To summarize, Proposition 1 states that the dynamic externality leads to more aggregate
capital utilization, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ result. Proposition 2 shows that the impact
of the dynamic and the market externality combined is more aggregate capital utilization.
Proposition 3 states that adding the market externality ‘on top of’ an already existing
dynamic externality, leads to more aggregate capital utilization if the elasticity of demand is
suﬃciently low with the threshold level of demand elasticity depending only on the number
of ﬁrms in the market. When the elasticity of demand is above this threshold level, it
is possible that adding the market externality to the dynamic externality, leads to less
29aggregate capital utilization, depending on a combined contribution of: (a) relatively low
convexity of the cost function (suﬃciently low ρ), (b) relatively low growth opportunities
for capital (a suﬃciently low α), (c) relatively high interest rates (a suﬃciently low δ), (d)
relatively high cost of labor (a suﬃciently high ν), and, (e) relatively weak endogenous
depreciation technology (a suﬃciently low θ).
4. Isolating the market externality: excludability - duopoly with
ﬁrms exploiting capital from diﬀerent providers
A third departure from the benchmark monopoly case is the market structure of two ﬁrms,
A and B, with each ﬁrm having exclusive expropriation rights on their own, separate capital
stock, but selling their products in the same market. Since nonexcludability of capital is
not the case any more, we must distinguish between two stocks of capital, kA and kB,a n d
assume that the initial capital stocks are equal, i.e., kA,0 = kB,0 > 0. This market structure
eliminates the dynamic externality and allows us to study the isolated eﬀects of the market
externality.
The capital stocks evolve according to,
kA,t+1 = f (kA,t) − ψ(qA,t) ,( 5 0 )
kB,t+1 = f (kB,t) − ψ(qB,t) .( 5 1 )
We use the superscript ‘D’ for this market structure and we denote the value function of the
duopolistic ﬁrms as V A,D and V B,D.18 These value functions depend on both capital stocks,
(kA,k B). Due to the symmetry of the problem, again, we can focus on the problem of ﬁrm
A, without loss of generality. The problem of the ﬁrm A in a Bellman-equation form is given
18Because all value functions and ﬁrm strategies in this section are bivariate, we use symbols “A,D”a n d
“B,D” as superscripts, in order to allow for partial derivatives to be denoted as subscripts. Despite this
slight notational discrepancy with the previous sections, this simpliﬁes the exposition.
30by,
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+δV
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,(52)
where QB,D(kA,k B) is the supply strategy of ﬁrm B. The problem of ﬁrm B is given by
switching A and B in the Bellman equation (52).
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by (52) are,
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Combining the last two equations yields the necessary condition,
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31where     k is the capital stock two periods ahead. The necessary optimal condition of ﬁrm B
is given by the same equation as (53), except that A and B are switched.
Compared to the benchmark monopoly model, the two new elements introduced in the
current setup are, (i) the presence of the other ﬁrm in the market contemporaneously, the
classic Cournot-competition motive, and, (ii) the fact that each ﬁrm takes into account that
changing its own capital stock may stimulate a response by its competitor that could trigger
a decrease in future revenues. A key complication that is revealed by (53), is that the partial
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, is essential for ﬁrm A to solve its problem.
In the parametric setup that we examine, we point out a way of tackling the problem,
although we do not perform analytical comparisons with the benchmark monopoly case. It is
very important to see, from (53), that the comparison with the benchmark monopoly is not
immediate or simple, and that the ways the market externality can inﬂuence the dynamics
require exploration.19
4.1 Firm strategies in the parametric framework





η−1kA and f (kB)=α
η
η−1kB ,
our example can lead to linearly homogeneous supply strategies with respect to (kA,k B).O u r
conjecture is motivated by the observation that linearly homogeneous strategies QA,D (kA,k B),
19We are not aware of studies that deal with the model of this subsection.






























Considering the equivalent expression for ﬁrm B, and working out algebraically the two
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,( 5 5 )
which results from adding up both sides of the two conditions. It is quite complicated to solve
the system given by (54) and (55) analytically for qA and qB, especially when kA  = kB.20
Yet, it is easy to prove that the equilibrium strategies, QA(kA,k B) and QB (kA,k B),t h a t
solve (54) and (55), under (19) are linearly homogeneous when kA = kB. This observation
20Under the stronger parametric restriction that ρ =1and β = 1
η, which is the restriction used in a previous
version of this paper (see Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003a)), the general analytical solution to the static
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We also know that QA
1 (kA,k B) and QA
2 (kA,k B) are homogeneous functions of degree 0.
When kA = kB, this condition holds throughout the entire equilibrium path in the dynamic
case due to symmetry, and the two partial derivatives are constants, say, QA
1 (kA,k B)=ω1
and QA
2 (kA,k B)=ω2, which makes the strategies linear. Hence the dynamic strategies can
be written as,
Q
A,D (kA,k B)=ω1kA + ω2kB ,( 5 6 )
and,
Q
B,D(kA,k B)=ω1kB + ω2kA .( 5 7 )
Therefore, (50) and (51) become,
ˆ kA = ZkA − θ(ω1kA + ω2kB) ,( 5 8 )
and





























which is also a quite complicated pair of formulas to work with in a dynamic setup (for example, a guess to
generalize for moving to a two-period model and for continuing onwards).
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The Bellman equation of ﬁrm A is,
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Taking the ﬁrst-order condition and, then, imposing the parameter constraint (19) and
symmetry, namely, ˆ kA = ˆ kB =[ Z − θ(ω1 + ω2)]k and qA = qB =( ω1 + ω2)k, we arrive at
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ρ−1 − β (ω1 + ω2)
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[Z − θ(ω1 + ω2)]
1
η − β [Z − θ(ω1 + ω2)]
.( 6 1 )
Turning now to the necessary condition given by (53), using the value function, (60),
the strategies (56), (57), (58) and (59), and, imposing the parameter constraint (19) and
symmetry, namely, ˆ kA = ˆ kB =[ Z − θ(ω1 + ω2)]k and qA = qB =( ω1 + ω2)k, we arrive at
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.( 6 2 )
Thus, equations (61) and (62) reconﬁrm that the strategies, QA,D (kA,k B) and QB,D(kA,k B)
are, indeed, linear.
The calculation method we suggest combines insights from (a) the necessary condition
with asymmetric stocks, (53), and, (b) from the necessary condition resulting from the
Bellman equation, (60), where the symmetry has already been imposed. The necessary
condition (53), with ex-ante asymmetric stocks (but ex-post symmetry, when calculating ω1
and ω2), and the value function (that has ex-ante the symmetry imposed), give the same
information in equilibrium. So, there are two diﬀerent but equivalent equations with two
degrees of freedom: ω1 and ω2. These ω’s can be calculated from this 2x2 system.
This is possible to do in symmetric games (with the same primitives and with the same
initial capital stocks of ﬁrms), where a carefully chosen parametric structure yields linear
strategies. First, the symmetry of the stocks implies a key feature: both capital stocks grow
at the same rate. Without balanced growth, the dynamics of prices would be cumbersome
or impossible to tackle analytically. Second, compared to the market structures examined
in the previous sections of this paper, the only additional information needed in order to
calculate the equilibrium strategies, is the partial derivative Q
B,D
1 (kA,k B), as (53) reveals.
The 0-degree homogeneity of partial derivatives when strategies are linearly homogeneous,
and the balanced growth of the two ﬁrms in symmetric equilibrium imply that the partial
derivative Q
B,D
1 (kA,k B)=ω2, i.e., Q
B,D
1 (kA,k B) is constant. With the method we suggest
36in this section we shed light on the diﬃcult problem of calculating the equilibrium strategies
in such a market structure.
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73 . 2 ≤ η